

Chinese Development Aid and Agribusiness Entrepreneurs in Africa

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China and Chinese entrepreneurs view agribusiness and farming in Africa as an economic opportunity for a variety of economic and politically-motivated reasons. These include the following aspects: (1) in the early years China believed that agriculture was the way to aid their developing comrades; (2) in the current situation China believes South-South cooperation will help African food security problems; (3) at present, agricultural endeavors provide opportunities and profits for SOEs at central, provincial, and city government levels; (4) at present many private-sector entrepreneurs and company owners are in Africa to seek profits in local markets, by exporting commodities to China (sometimes with value-added in Africa), or by importing Chinese goods to Africa; and (5) some families and individuals have started farms and businesses to better themselves, since they perceive conditions to be more favorable in Africa than in China. For some in all these categories, doing agricultural activities in Africa has helped increase their wealth and has provided good opportunities.

INTRODUCTION

There is much interest in Chinese economic presence in Africa in terms of agricultural assistance and entrepreneurial activities, as well as a corresponding interest in African reactions to their presence. This paper considers some aspects of each side in terms of the people involved. It looks at Chinese economic activities and technical endeavors in Africa, as well as their motivations to come to Africa and the networks and linkages that facilitate their presence there. Recently, a number of studies have discussed China's policy of non-interference in development aid, the economics of international resource extraction, and Chinese presence in Africa in terms of diplomacy, neo-colonialism, and imperialism (Alden, 2007; Alden et al., 2008; Bräutigam, 1998; Broadman, 2007; Junger, 2007; Large, 2008; Manji and Marks, 2007; Melber, 2007; Taylor, 2006).

The prowess of Chinese entrepreneurs in China and around the world is legendary. Issues of entrepreneurship have been interwoven with their migrations, and related to the role of the state, globalization, and transnationalism that include aspects of ethnicity, legal status, religion, family and kinship, inter-racial relations, and remittances. While some studies of Chinese overseas focus on sector, ethnicity, gender, and minority status as socio-economic reference points (e.g., Benton and Pieke, 1998; Thunø, 2007), others focus on social relations and networks. Much of the literature on overseas Chinese entrepreneurs focuses on how the political and institutional frameworks of the host country shape their coping strategies (Bongardt and Nevis, 2006; McKeown, 2001). Only a few studies by anthropologists focus on the actual activities, views, and behaviors of Chinese people in Africa, and most consider Chinese entrepreneurship in the private sector. These include studies of Chinese shops in Cape Verde (Haugen and Carling, 2005); traders in Namibia (Dobler, 2008); the informal-sector textile sector in Togo (Sylvanus, 2007a, b); social relations in South Africa (Hart, 2002) and food habits in Zanzibar (Hsu, 2007). A recent study surveys African views of Chinese economic activities in ten African countries (Sautman and Yan, 2008).

There are numerous news stories and reports on China's agricultural activities in Africa stemming from the 1960s, but few scholarly studies and analyses of Chinese agricultural endeavors in Africa (e.g., Bräutigam, 1998; Ping, 1999). This paper briefly considers the Chinese presence in agricultural endeavors that include technical assistance (both bilateral and multilateral); private entrepreneurs doing agribusiness; and individual farmers (creative entrepreneurs and landless farmers). It touches briefly on

China's development model that mixes technical assistance with commercial endeavors. It discusses a current debate, the essence of neo-imperialism, as to whether or not China will use African food resources to feed its own population. The "yes" and "no" arguments are outlined. As well, some case studies from Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania are given and set the stage for further research this year. Finally, some African reactions to the Chinese presence are noted.

THE CHINESE IN AFRICA

China, the new mature global player, has increased its presence in numerous ways in almost all African countries in the past decade. What is the reality of Chinese-African financial and social interactions on the ground? Is the Chinese presence in Africa a "marriage of convenience," related to its quest for resources, or based on development ideologies? In response to globalization and entry into the WTO in 2001, China's "opening-up policy" evolved into a combination of "bringing in" and "going out." In this regard, China has not only attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) from developed countries, but also has encouraged and supported outbound investment from its public and private sectors in developing countries (Alden, 2007; Broadman, 2007). This south-south economic partnership has gained momentum especially in Africa. The Chinese government also implemented the "grab the big, loose the small" strategy that consolidates and supports large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in energy, construction, transportation, and agriculture, while privatizing small- and medium-scale enterprises. Thus, the state also encourages the private sector to participate in these strategies.

China thinks of itself as is an old friend of Africa, who combated colonialism shoulder-to-shoulder and helped independence movements in the 1950s and 1960s. Cooperation and economic development dramatically intensified in the 1990s, but China's interest in gaining Africa's resources "has taken on a significantly "profit-centered outlook" in the 2000s (Sautman and Yan, 2006:8). Partly a result of China's own extraordinary domestic growth rate, its foreign policy and development strategies have greatly expanded. China established several "investment centers" in Africa and is the third largest trader with Africa (after the U.S. and France), but its position may increase. In 2000, China established the Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) that now has 48 African member countries (Shelton, 2005). Chinese FDI in Africa overshadowed western investors starting in 2006 (Zafar, 2007). China has also forgiven debt (31 countries), carried out a peace missions, sent medical and agricultural experts, trained African students, and funded hundreds of agricultural and infrastructure projects in most African countries.

China's policy of non-interference in nation states fits well with many fragile African democracies and pariah states. China's non-conditional loans have lured many African countries away from western and multilateral donors that require transparency and good governance. Since China does not use its "soft power" to aid political accountability, some argue that the political effects will eventually harm Africa (Thompson, 2005; Tull, 2006). Many scholars see oil, timber, and metals (copper, iron, platinum) as China's main interest (Broadman, 2007; Taylor, 2006, Wang, 2007); political scientists view geo-strategic concerns as also paramount (Kaplinsky, McCormick, and Morris, 2006). Bräutigam suggests that China can provide "a model for lower-tech industrial development, stimulating the spin-off of manufacturing or acting to jump-start local investment" (2007:1). As a result of the influx of Chinese goods and factory takeovers, some countries disagree: for example, South Africa and Zambia experienced decline and demise of their textile and mining industries (Alden, 2007; Ngomba, 2007; Sylvanus, 2007). China's projects may cause environmental degradation, and conditions for African and Chinese workers may be abysmal (e.g., Manji and Marks, 2007). Chinese projects offer few jobs for Africans, as contractors bring their own laborers (Gong, 2007). But the Chinese government's perspective stresses that assistance to Africa is genuine and unconditional. "We do not attach conditions to our aid and we will not do it in the future" (Zhang Yesui, China's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/18/content_7272823.htm). Of particular distinction, is that China funds infrastructure and agricultural projects that western donors lost interest in doing.

Scholars now debate whether or not China is an investor (dynamic partner) or a threatening predator. Zafar (2007:103) argues that Africa can “reduce its marginalization from the global economy” because of China. China argues that western media plays up the “China threat in Africa” and the neo-colonization theme as China continues to strengthen its political and economic ties with Africa. (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/18/content_7272823.htm).

CHINA’S AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND INTERESTS IN AFRICA

This section briefly considers a number of sub-topics relating to China’s agricultural policy and the execution of its agricultural development aid (bilaterally and multilaterally, not-for profit and for-profit) in Africa that have been summarized here from diverse sources based on the history of extensive Chinese agricultural aid in Africa. China has a long history of agricultural assistance in Africa stemming from the 1950s and 1960s when agriculture projects for self-reliance was its mode, followed by infrastructural projects in the 1970s and 1980s. China carried out hundreds of small- to medium-sized rice projects; some were executed by Ministry of Agriculture companies (AGRICON), and most consisted of technical packages and strategies based on China’s domestic policies. Bräutigam (1998) compared such similar projects in Gambia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone finding that differences in results were based on African countries domestic political policies. Table 1 compares the basic strategies of such projects for this time period with projects being conducted by other bilateral and multilateral agencies.

Table 1 Agricultural Development Projects in Africa of Comparable Size, 1950s-1990s

China’s Bilateral Projects	Other Countries’ Bilateral and Multilateral Projects
Large team of experts to work with people	Small expatriate staff with country team
State-owned agricultural stations with strict water and cultivation	Work with individuals and small groups of villagers
Large state-owned rice plantations	Work with many local farmers in small fields

Source: constructed from Bräutigam (1998)

China believed that developing countries should concentrate on agriculture to feed their populations, and so paid particular attention to agricultural projects in its foreign assistance (Bräutigam, 1998). In conceptualizing these projects, the Chinese argued that there should be mutual benefit and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. The particular style of project development was unique. Because on the non-convertibility of Chinese currency until recently, all project materials and infrastructure were shipped from China. Projects were conceived of as being handed-over in fully working condition at completion. Essentially these were “turn-key” projects presented to countries, sometimes with additional Chinese technical guidance (Ping 1999). For example, in Tanzania, China built Mbarali Farm (that met a quarter of the domestic rice needs with 8 tons/hectare yields, astounding for Africa, and that had Chinese working alongside Tanzanians for 20 years until 1993); the Ubungo Farm Implements Plant that used to produce 85% of Tanzania’s hand-held farm tools; and three technical extension stations that focused on maize and vegetable production (Ping, 1999). All were turn-key projects handed over to Tanzania, and all had some Chinese technical workers for guidance but not for project management. Subsequently, with Tanzania facing budget shortages, these farms and factories operated at greatly reduced capacities. By the late 1990s, over 10,000 Chinese technical personnel had been sent to Tanzania alone; but many of the Chinese experts’ reports noted severe management issues by the Tanzania staff after takeover that hindered project maintenance. As well, China’s bilateral aid was hindered by (1) a shortage of project funds; (2) inexperience in market economy societies so it could not provide adequate marketing channels for African farmers; and (3) little knowledge by Chinese technicians of African languages, local economic practices, and cultural conditions (ibid).

In these early projects, there were two groups of Chinese personnel engaged in projects: specialists (ministry officials and personnel from the corporations and institutions under it) and temporary project managers, engineers, technicians, occasional language teachers, and interpreters. Projects involved agricultural production and processing projects, factories to produce farm equipment, and extension services. However, by the mid-1990s and continuing to the present, China's economic cooperation intensified, and its bilateral agricultural projects become joint ventures and for-profit; China also carried out some south-south multilateral projects. The numbers of Chinese in Africa was estimated at greater than 750,000 in 2007 (French and Polgreen, 2007b), but the number involved in agricultural endeavors, including fishing is unknown, although China had 21% of its commercial ocean fleet in African waters in 2007. Table 2 gives a list of the main categories of people involved in agricultural activities today in various African countries. Most are men, although women are involved in all categories.

Table 2 Categories of Chinese involved in Agriculture in Africa

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Diplomats and negotiators of agricultural contracts and development aid projects2. Aid projects: project managers, engineers, technical experts, translators (on contracts)3. SOE companies: managers, technical experts, workers, (on contracts and investment projects)4. Private-sector agribusiness owners, managers, workers: small to medium "farming" and agro-processing operations5. Import export agents and traders of commodities, farm machinery and agro-chemicals (SME, medium, large, value-added)6. Informal-sector hawkers and marketers7. Contract workers and laborers (farms and agroindustry)8. Relatives, spouses, and children |
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Source: Author

China's current development assistance model mixes bilateral development aid with commercial (for-profit) endeavors. China also aims to intensify cooperation in executing experimental and demonstrative agricultural technology projects, viewing its own technologies as appropriate for Africa in grain growing, seed breeding (especially hybrid rice), animal and poultry production, biological pest control, rain fed farming, biogas, and wind power utilization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2006). With its experience in Africa since the 1960s, China notes its own abundant labor force skilled in agriculture and appropriate agricultural machinery. The current focus is on crops, fisheries, processing plants, agricultural infrastructure and staff training. Recent Tanzania-China for-profit activities in agricultural sector include the Zhongken Biotechnology Enterprises, a Subsidiary of China State Farm Agribusiness Corporation, Mbarali Rice Demonstration Farm, and the Chongqing Seed Company representing Chinese central government, provincial, and city SOEs respectively). Hence, Chinese development aid and investment in African agriculture is growing. The Chinese government has a different development perspective compared to western and other Asian donors both initially and currently (turn-key projects, for-profit technical assistance and demonstration farms; seed breeding for Chinese preferences; land deals with African countries for Chinese farms and farmers; and large food/raw agricultural purchases). Broadman (2007, and personal communication, 2009) argues that Chinese agricultural exports from Africa are more processed and have more value-added than raw commodity exports from African governments with processed cocoa, roasted coffee, and carded cotton being examples.

In addition to hundreds of bilateral agricultural projects throughout the continent in the last four decades, since the mid-1990s, China has carried out multilateral South-South development aid, part of a global initiative and the largest program of its kind working through the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) food security program (FAO 2006a, 2006b). Such projects were carried out in Ethiopia (1998), Mauritania (1999), Mali (2000), Nigeria (2003), Sierra Leone (2006), and Gabon (2007). For example, the Government of Nigeria met the \$22.7 project costs from 2003 to 2007 within the framework of its National Special Program for Food Security developed with FAO. China provided 20

experts and over 500 field technicians for four years. The project spanned all 36 states and 23,000 rural households focusing on water control, fishery, crops, livestock, and veterinary services.

A 2008 evaluation of the work of the Chinese in Nigeria and Tanzania was carried out by a Chinese team that included anthropologist Dr. Zhao Xudong. The evaluation noted that the Nigerians said Chinese counterparts were sincere, honest, considerate, but had limited English and knowledge of local culture (Li, Zhao, and Wang, 2008). Their reports revealed the horrified response of local Nigerians when Chinese men displayed cultural insensitivity by wearing shorts and no tops in a Muslim area. The Chinese experts in turn were upset that they were not involved in project monitoring. Some contributed their own money to assist farmers since the project lacked funds, while others were hired by Nigerians for their private farms rather than helping individual project farmers.

CHINESE AGRICULTURAL ENTREPRENEURS AND WORKERS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Private-sector entrepreneurs from small to large also are increasing in the agricultural sector. These include those who own or manage farm enterprises (crop, livestock, timber), fishing operations, and agroprocessing companies, as well as companies manufacturing farm tools/machinery and agrochemicals. The scale of operations varies from individual/family-owned farms to large plantations. It is in this category/level that research on additional case studies is in process. In 2008, Jiao, (Spring's doctoral student), studied 30 Chinese entrepreneurs in Ghana, some in agribusiness, in SOEs and private-sector businesses in food services, fishing, general trade, manufacturing (including farm machinery), construction, and mining. He found that (1) Chinese entrepreneurs knew little about Ghanaian culture and society that resulted in misunderstandings concerning Ghanaian business regulations; (2) family networks and *guanxi* relations were the basis of bringing Chinese to Ghana and of hiring Chinese managers and workers; (3) few Chinese socialized with Ghanaians, but did interact with Ghanaian employees and clients; and (4) Chinese men and women in business created an informal business organization (the Ghana Central China Chamber of Commerce) to help members understand and overcome business regulations. He also considered two medium-sized fishing businesses in Accra. The fleet was Chinese-owned and the labor force consisted of Chinese fishing crews and Ghanaian workers. One company was a SOE by the province of Shandong with a match from the central Chinese government that processed fish for sale in Europe. The second was a private company that sold its catch to Ghanaians. In early 2009, a joint venture in aquaculture through Ghana's Ministry of Fisheries was started, with Ghana providing over 2,000 acres, with fish destined for Ghana and China. China also has ocean fishing operations in 12 countries (370 fishing vessels or 21% of vessels in this category) to supply fish to itself (Agriffchina.com, 2006).

As well, individual farmers and entrepreneurs own and operate farms for domestic markets, often undercutting African growers, marketers, traders, and wholesalers. For example, one farmer from Shandong province invested \$450,000 in a farm in Sudan where his workers are refugees from Darfur. Others in Zambia started innovative business such as growing shiitake mushrooms, cutting off South African imports. Some of the stories of former urbanites in China tell how they came to Africa to do farming and agribusiness; they view Africa as a "new frontier" and produce commodities for China, as well as for the local market. An additional phenomenon is the large-scale migration of landless Chinese farmers to Africa to farm and settle. The head of the Export-Import Bank in the city of Chongqing said the government would support farmers ("capital investment, product development and product-selling channels") who migrated, since finding city jobs in China for landless Chinese farmers would be problematic. He said that in Chongqing, there are 12 million farmers, but "in Africa, there is plenty of land but food production is unsatisfactory...Chongqing's labor exports have just started but they will take off once we convince the farmers to become landlords abroad." In fact, labor exports from the city grew 33% between 2006 and 2007 (*South China Morning Post*, 2007). Not by co-incidence, the Chongqing

Seed Company is involved in providing seeds to Africa and setting up the rice demonstration farms, recently on 300 hectares in Tanzania. The city of Chongqing is also responsible for technical assistance and training for growing corn and paddy rice. Another SOE farm, Johnken farm in Zambia owned by the China Farming Corporation, and one of 150 large SOEs administered by the Assets Commission of the State Council received land, and is the subject of many Chinese news articles that discuss how Ms. Li Li, a 43 year old nurse took over the management of the farm when her husband died (he was a lecturer at an agricultural university previously) (*Xinhua News Agency*, 2006). The farm by 2007 captured Lusaka's poultry (US\$2.9 million in sales) and with its additional products earns \$5.9 million. Hence, government and private sector entrepreneurship may intersect.

FOOD FROM AFRICA FOR CHINA AND AFRICAN FARMLAND FOR CHINESE FARMERS

The current debate is whether or not or to what extent China will use of Africa to out-source some of its major food needs. Those who think this will happen to a large extent point to China's need for grains and meat to feed its growing and more affluent population, while its farmland is decreasing (Gray, 2008; World Watch Institute, 2008). A significant development is that China stopped rice exports in January 2008 (Sol Katz, personal communication March 2009). Others argue that this is unlikely due to high transport costs from Africa, risk of nationalization, the continent's low yields due to rain fed farms and periodic droughts. Still others state that it is not right to take food from hungry Africans (Davies, 2006; Manji, 2008). Another perspective is that China can help Africa's green revolution by boosting food yields, especially hybrid rice (Ma and Croese, 2008). In fact, China's imports of primary food commodities and primary agricultural raw materials from Africa between 1994 and 2003 hugely increased by 628% and 437% respectively (COMTRADE data cited in Manji and Marks, 2007:23 and Mayer and Fajarnes, 2008:88). However, the data are not disaggregated enough to show whether agricultural commodities come from Chinese production in Africa (e.g., large rice farms in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone), African government marketing boards, or African farmers (cooperatives, plantations, etc.). China has negotiated large purchases of crops from specific countries: for example, citrus (South Africa), rice and cassava (Nigeria), tobacco and cotton (Malawi), cocoa (Ghana), and sisal (Tanzania). China has also been repaid in a portion of a nation's crop for its loans. Ghana initially used 10% of its cocoa crop as compensation towards the US\$15bn Bui Dam built by China (Professor Daniel Sarpong, personal communication, 2007).

Furthermore, connected to this is what has been termed China's "land grab" (grants, purchases, and leases) by Chinese SOEs, private companies, and individual owners in many African countries (e.g., Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe) (Alden, 2007; Karumbidza, 2007; Kragelund, 2008; Lee et al., 2007; Manji and Marks, 2007). African leaders have been willing to give land to China for projects and enterprises. Zimbabwe gave Chinese farmers 386 square miles of farmland (confiscated from white framers presumably to give to black farmers) (Karumbidza, 2007:97). Zambia provided land for factories and farms including Friendship Johnken Farm. China is not unique in its search for land deals. For example, South Korea leased land in 2008 to grow food in Madagascar, but it proposed to hire local workers.

SOME AFRICAN REACTIONS TO CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS

Many Chinese intellectuals say "we are just trying to do something good" about their county's political and financial interests in Africa (Ngomba, 2007). But anti-Chinese sentiments have grown in Ghana, Zambia, and South Africa because of undercutting textile industries, promulgating labor abuses, and violating human rights (French and Polgreen, 2007a, b; Ngomba, 2007). Ngomba also notes that harm to textile industries, on one hand, and debt forgiveness and loans, on the other, are confusing, and that China is a "smiling dragon with arms stretched to Africa, at once welcoming, friendly and yet dangerous" (<http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=16169#relatedlinks>).

African governments have low entry requirements for Chinese and others to enter their countries. They often give Chinese SOEs many contracts and private entrepreneurs' investment incentives, business concessions, permits, and reduced taxes. In particular, African leaders have given land for agricultural endeavors, housing and businesses. Incentives may be greater in weak and pariah countries than in democratic ones (Alden, 2007; Manji and Marks, 2007). African business people in Nigeria and Zambia are upset with their government's policies and have protested to government with few results.

A case study of 1,000 in Cameroon shows that the influx of Chinese "citizens, goods and money to Africa has been greeted with a lot of consternation and suspicion in most African countries" (Ngome, 2007). Seventy percent were "alarmed" by the increasing and uncontrolled numbers. Some noted that China has many poor people, so "there is no ground for their pretending to want to help African states" and "they come to exploit what the Europeans left untouched" (<http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=15986>). Other fear unemployment, since Chinese have replaced Cameroonians in the informal sector (even prepared street foods!). Others note that Chinese shops generate employment for African assistants. The African poor can purchase cheaper goods, although people think they are of low quality. Robust civil society organizations (in countries such as Ghana, South Africa, Zambia) are starting to be watchdogs of Chinese investments and hiring practices. Some refute statistics on the undercounting of Chinese workers and argue for hiring Africans in Chinese projects.

Sautman and Yan (2008) studied 10 countries to obtain African reactions to the Chinese presence, project and business. Answers were more favorable in Sudan and least favorable in South Africa. Responses were somewhat to very positive on China's path to development; on China's "just in it for natural resources," responses were neutral to strongly agree. On Chinese doing small business, many said it helps but causes problems for local people. On Chinese companies doing large projects that benefit people, respondents were neutral to being very satisfied. However on "increased Chinese migration benefiting Africa," Africans ranged from neutral to having negative views. However, there are no studies on African views and reactions to Chinese agriculture and fishing in Africa, although African farmers and marketers complain about having their prices for produce and grains undercut.

By contrast, African leaders believe that China is closer to their development realities and conditions, and that China is the new superpower in general and for investment. "From the promulgation of Zimbabwe's 'Look East' policy to the blossoming of Chinese-language studies in Nigeria, the African continent is eagerly embracing Chinese capital, its diplomatic entreaties and even cultural trappings at an unprecedented rate" (Alden, 2007:59). Alden delineates three types of regimes with differing relationship to China: "pariah partnerships, illiberal regimes or weak democracies with commodity-based economies, and democracies with diversified economies" (ibid: 59-60). Chinese-African partnerships have been welcomed in several dictatorships (e.g., Sudan and Zimbabwe) and in the weak states (e.g., Angola and Chad), where elites have become enriched through Chinese resources. The deals that African leaders have made are reflected in data on their countries exports, but the imports are a combination of smaller business deals by more types of businesses. Views of African governments were discussed in an earlier paper (Spring and Jiao. 2008).

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

China and Chinese entrepreneurs view agribusiness and farming in Africa as an economic opportunity for a variety of economic and politically-motivated reasons. These include the following aspects: (1) in the early years China believed that agriculture was the way to aid their developing comrades; (2) in the current situation China believes South-South cooperation will help African food security problems; (3) at present, agricultural endeavors provide opportunities and profits for SOEs at central, provincial, and city government levels; (4) at present many private-sector entrepreneurs and company owners are in Africa to seek profits in local markets, by exporting commodities to China (sometimes with value-added in Africa), or by importing Chinese goods to Africa; and (5) some families and individuals have started farms and

businesses to better themselves, since they perceive conditions to be more favorable in Africa than in China. For some in all these categories, doing agricultural activities in Africa has helped increase their wealth and has provided good opportunities.

From the African perspective, many government leaders and officials see Chinese involvement as providing opportunities to deliver infrastructure and agricultural know-how. For African farmers and agribusiness owners, Chinese farm operations on African soil are threats to local markets and African land tenure systems, and further threats, if China farms in Africa to feed China. Increasingly, civil society in Africa is concerned about China's extraction of resources and endangering African industries and environment more than African leaders. African entrepreneurs fear market competition and low African participation in Chinese enterprises. As well, many Africans do not have as many opportunities to increase their wealth.

The emerging study on China in Africa has yet to see much ethnography and will benefit by exploring the views of both Chinese and Africans on how China's policies, technical assistance, and public and private-sectors entrepreneurial activities have been carried out and received by African leaders, local entrepreneurs, and citizens. Future research directions include a multi-country study of Ghana, Tanzania, and South Africa in which in-depth ethnographic studies of Chinese settlers and contractors and their motivations, risks, and opportunities will be explored. The views of both sides (Chinese and African) will be explored in terms of issues of neo-imperialism, food security for Africa and China, knowledge of each other's entrepreneurship, farming and agribusiness practices, technical assistance needs, and agribusiness investments, and commodity purchases. Also to be researched are African views of Chinese technical assistance and agribusiness. What do African agricultural professionals, researchers, ministry of agriculture personnel, agribusiness owners, and farmers think of Chinese technologies (e.g., irrigation, hybrid seeds development, soil management, machinery, extension methods, etc.); the appropriateness of Chinese technical assistance for African women and men farmers; and the affects of China's agricultural assistance on African farmers' food security? Will Chinese settlement and farming in Africa rise significantly? Will one country build a continent?

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